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Over the past three decades a rather astonishing change occurred in the trajectory of capitalist 
societies. Working class achievements that were formerly seen as examples of capitalism’s success –
rising standards of living, growing economic security – were suddenly redefined as ‘problems’. 
Concessions and permanent insecurity became the new norm, rising inequality the new inevitability. 
The catch-all term to describe this was ‘neoliberalism’ and Adolph Reed, a prominent US 
political scientist, nicely summarized its essence as ‘capitalism without a working class opposition.’1 
This succinctly highlights the kind of society we get when labour is weak. But more important, it 
pushes us to confront the limited resistance of labour to that rightward shift since the end of the 
1970s. This period did of course witness examples of courageous struggles and moments that 
brought glimpses of labour’s potentials. In fact, the response of Canadian labour was generally more 
impressive than elsewhere. Yet given the extent of the assault on working people, labour’s response 
was too sporadic, too timid, and far too narrow in scope. It’s this failure that I want to discuss – not 
in any spirit of giving up on unions, but as part of demanding more from this crucial institution.  
The last time there was as profound an economic breakdown as the recent financial crisis was 
in the 1930s. The contrast between the labour movement’s current reaction and the earlier one 
couldn’t be starker. Then, with the predominantly craft-based unions reeling and trapped in 
exclusive, increasingly bureaucratized structures, a rebellion within the labour movement – with 
communists playing a prominent role – gave birth to industrial unionism, an inclusive unionism 
committed to organizing across skills, race and gender.  
The new unionism brought dramatic new tactics such as the sit-downs, new strategies that 
included industry-wide bargaining, and spread new forms of in-plant democracy based on the shop 
steward system. Today union structures are again in crisis, but nothing comparable to the labour 
explosion of the 30s has yet emerged or is even much talked about. When those of us who support 
labour by silencing ourselves out of sensitivity to the assault it’s facing, we do labour no favour. 
Nothing is more important to the renewal of the labour movement than to soberly confront the 
mess it’s in and encourage the most open and creative discussion of how it might move on.  
In addressing this, I want to set out three arguments. First, that unless we bring the notion of 
class, in all its complexities, back into our strategies, no renewal of labour is possible. Second, to 
speak about bringing class into our unions isn’t about abstract ideological pronouncements; it’s 
about addressing the very practical needs of the working class, its responsibilities and potentials. It’s 
also not about putting forth radical policy alternatives if we’re not at the same time building the 
power to actually act radically. And that involves transforming everything about unions’ structures 
and functioning. Third, unions alone –	  even stronger and better ones – aren’t enough. Success in 
defending and advancing the lives of working people will require new forms of working class 
organizations beyond unions.  
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Making Men 
Capitalists have always had a contradictory relationship to the working class: they need 
workers to generate profits, but bringing workers together opens the door to unions and resistance. 
This tension extends to the role of states. For all the rhetoric against state intervention, capitalists in 
fact need strong states for, among other things, protecting their property and making and managing 
markets. But the risk of workers using their electoral power to influence these states leaves 
capitalists nervous about regulations (with their limits on how corporations make profits) and taxes 
(which make social claims on those profits). Capitalists are also worried that instead of following 
private sector workers, workers in the state sector might themselves set the standards – as they did 
to a significant extent in the late 60s. And so capital tends to articulate the importance of restraining 
the state even as it increases its practical dependence on it. 
Above all, capitalists fear that workers might begin to question capitalism as the natural order 
of things, and wonder if capitalism has run its course and might be replaced with a more humane 
alternative. This priority of keeping workers in check has a long history and in this regard, the 
introduction of the auto assembly line on the eve of WWI is especially revealing. By then the Ford 
Motor Company already had a ‘sociology department’ to spy on workers both on the job and in 
their personal lives. The concern was to ensure they lived up to Henry Ford’s moral code and more 
important, that they shied away from unions.  
The head of this department declared at the time that ‘Mr. Ford’s business is the making of 
men and he manufacturers automobiles on the side to defray his expenses.’2 This was more than a 
clever line. The making of the kind of men and women that could fit capitalism’s often inhuman 
needs was always critical to the making of capitalism, and remains so today. Ford’s control over 
labour included both direct repression and ideological integration, but repression was too blunt an 
instrument and corporate ideology was too contradictory – workers quickly saw that the promises 
never matched actual experiences.  
These limits were driven home at the time through individual expressions of resistance; 
workers simply left and the company had to hire 4 workers for every one that stayed (a turnover rate 
of almost 400%, compared to a norm of about 4% or less today).3 Henry Ford’s solution was to 
substantially increase the material inducement to stay by famously introducing the $5/day wage. 
This of course came with increased speedup and restrictions: to qualify, workers had to refrain from 
gambling or drinking, immigrants had to take classes to learn ‘the American Way’, and any man with 
a wife in the workforce was excluded. In any case, that innovation proved temporary. With 
intensifying competition squeezing profits, Henry Ford’s ‘generosity’ didn’t last very long.  
During the depression, General Motors (GM) faced a related problem, but this time the 
concern wasn’t the individual resistance reflected in worker turnover, but the arrival of unionism 
and collective resistance. A telling response was two documentaries produced by the company.4 The 
first, in mid-1936, was called Master Hands.5 With innovative film techniques and an operatic score 
by the German composer Richard Wagner played by the Detroit Philharmonic, the film takes place 
almost entirely within the workplace and pays tribute to the remarkable skills and muscular labour 
that went into the design, development, and production of cars. A short sixteen months later, 
however, GM surprisingly shelved that film, replacing it with another by the same film-maker called 
From Dawn to Sunset.6 This later film begins in a suburban home. The worker wakens to a hearty 
breakfast prepared by his proud and fawning wife, kisses her goodbye on the way out the door, and 
joins thousands of other workers driving to work, this time for a relatively short interlude on the 
assembly line. He is soon back to take his wife shopping where they are happily welcomed by local 
businessmen. Then comes a relaxing time at home listening to the radio and reading.  
What accounts for this drastic difference in the two films? Though so close together 
chronologically, they were separated by the great distance of the industry’s unionization. The first 
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was made before the wave of sit-downs led by the United Auto Workers (UAW), the other after the 
union was recognized. While the end product in the first film was a car, in the second it is a pay 
check, transforming the active power to collectively produce into the passive power to individually 
consume.  
Like Ford, however, GM couldn’t fully implement this strategy, this time primarily because of 
the depression. But that strategic focus on what was called ‘productivism’ – emphasizing labour-
management co-operation to prioritize the size of the pie to be distributed – was revived by US 
business and the American state in the more favourable circumstances following WWII. It quickly 
spread to Canada and Europe. But its spread was not automatic. Coming out of the war, many 
workers and returning soldiers were receptive to the left’s more radical emphasis on questions of 
power and equality, the extension of worker rights in the workplaces and democratic public control 
over investment.  
The strategy corporations and states implemented to deal with this was double-edged. One 
aspect was a concerted drive to isolate and repress the radical left. A good many union leaders, 
competing with the left for leadership or looking for respectability, were complicit in this assault. 
The other, ‘friendlier’ message was that workers could, within capitalism, slowly achieve the essence 
of the security and material well-being that the left promised – and with less risk. In retrospect, that 
purge of a relatively small but strategically important minority turned out to be a very decisive defeat 
of the Canadian labour movement as a whole. The outcome was that working class politics was 
generally narrowed to operating within capitalism, and worker demands were likewise generally 
narrowed to focusing on wages and benefits. In the relatively full employment days of the 1950s and 
1960s, workers in fact made very significant economic gains, negotiating what were essentially 
private welfare states for themselves and were even able to retain some workplace rights.  
Yet once again, aiming to tie the interests of the working class to the success of capitalism 
proved contradictory. In the late 60s, workers made confident by employment security stood up to 
management authority and maintained their heady expectations for rising consumption even as the 
exceptional conditions for the post-war boom faded. In that context capitalists found it increasingly 
difficult to both buy off worker militancy and meet their profit goals. After a great deal of 
uncertainty through the 70s over how to respond, capital states regained their footing and countered 
with the series of policies we now label neoliberalism. The vulnerability of workers to this new 
aggressiveness had its roots in the post-war defeat of the left and some of labour’s best activists, but 
it was also related to labour’s recent successes. Those successes now increasingly depended on the 
particular skills developed through periodic bargaining and the technical-legalistic practice of 
grievances, and less on the organizing, mobilizing and community-building skills developed in the 
earlier period. The more recent set of skills were of limited help in coming to grips with the nature 




And yet the Canadian working class continued to demonstrate a remarkable resilience and 
strategic sophistication. Neoliberalism came to Canada in the mid-70s, earlier than in the other 
developed countries, including the US. This ‘anticipatory neoliberalism’ was rooted in the fear 
among Canadian elites, ever sensitive to Canada’s economic ties to the US, that the continuing 
militancy of Canadian labour threatened the competitiveness and profits of corporations operating 
in Canada. When the government imposed controls on collective bargaining, this brought on a one 
day general strike on October 14, 1976 – the first such action in Canada since 1919 and the first 
general strike in North American since the 1930s. Yet as impressive as the protest was, it did not 
force a reversal in the trajectory of state policy.  
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In the mid-80s, Canada initiated free trade talks with the US to consolidate Canada’s special 
access to US markets. This deeper economic integration tied Canadian workers even closer to the 
uniquely weak American labour movement, with an expectation on the part of Canadian elites that 
this would help discipline Canadian workers. The breakaway of the Canadian autoworkers from 
their US parent in the midst of the drive to neoliberalism and continental integration suggested that 
something special was emerging within Canadian labour. This was confirmed as Canadian unions 
launched, along with their movement partners, one of the most vigorous educational-political 
campaigns against free trade anywhere. In spite of widespread opposition to the trade deal, the 
Liberals and New Democratic Party (NDP) split the oppositional vote and free trade prevailed 
(whether a defeat of free trade would have ended or only postponed the free trade juggernaut is of 
course a different story).  
Another decade later, in the mid-90s, this time in response to a right-wing Ontario 
government looking to accelerate the erosion of the welfare state, labour and its movement allies 
carried out a uniquely creative tactic: a series of rotating community-wide general strikes that came 
to eight communities over 2 ½ years, a highlight of which was some 250,000 demonstrators – the 
largest ever in Toronto – shutting down the city’s core. These ‘days of action’ slowed the right but it 
too didn’t reverse the trend.  
Such responses on the part of Canadian labour – and there were other significant province-
wide protests in British Columbia (BC) and Quebec – demonstrated an impressive capacity to go 
beyond the confines of unionism and act politically, including a notable emphasis on popular 
education and recruiting young workers to activism. Through that process, de facto political 
leadership on major issues shifted from the NDP to unions. In each case the NDP believed that 
labour’s actions misunderstood the public mood, hurt the NDP’s electoral chances and diverted 
labour activists from elections to the politics of the street. Yet what was confirmed was both the 
bankruptcy of the NDP’s cautious leadership role and, in contrast, the labour movement’s potential 
as an agent of social protest. 
And yet measured in terms of the stated goals, this politicization was disappointingly 
unsuccessful. As has often happened in the past, the demoralization of having done everything 
possible, and still failing, set the stage for even greater defeats. Some tried to channel the frustrations 
back to a more pragmatic support for the NDP, but that very emphasis on pragmatism pushed 
others to go further and make deals with the liberals. A good many union leaders, concluding that 
industrial action and street politics were futile, turned to corporate deals with employers, with some 
grumbling from a disoriented rank-and-file but little actual opposition.  
 
 
Disorganizing the Class 
If the Canadian labour movement mobilized its members, built effective alliances with social 
movements and introduced innovative tactics, why then did it still fail? Before getting to where the 
labour movement fell short, it’s important to appreciate the depth of what it was up against. For 
capitalist elites the crisis of the 1970s, like that of the previous crisis of the 1930s, had raised the 
dangerous prospect of countries turning to protectionism and capital controls and thereby 
interrupting the continued making of global capitalism. Neoliberalism served to avoid such national 
divisions between capitalists by uniting them in class warfare against each of their respective working 
classes.  
Crucial here was the extent to which, directly and indirectly, neoliberalism was able to 
reinforce already existing barriers to the formation of workers into a coherent oppositional class. As 
the then president of the UAW, Doug Fraser, angrily declared at the end of the 1970s, a class war 
was being waged but only one class – the owners – were fighting.7	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This issue of class requires some elaboration. Workers may be a class in terms of their place in 
society, but this doesn't necessarily translate into identifying themselves as such or acting 
accordingly. Powerful forces within the regular operations of capitalism divide workers, tie them to 
employers rather than each other, and reduce them to isolated individuals. Workers are not only 
divided by workplace and by personal characteristics like gender and ethnicity but are also stratified 
by income levels and in their relation to work (full-time or part-time; employed, unemployed or 
unemployable). The neoliberal deregulation of labour markets – whether through the erosion of 
legislated labour standards, moving the public sector to private sector norms or active de-
unionization – heightened the inequalities and stratification within the working class and thereby 
exacerbated its internal fragmentation.  
Workers are, as well, dependent on their employers for work and wages. Based on daily 
experiences, it is no surprise that workers tend to identify their bosses as the bearers of economic 
and scientific knowledge, the ones with the capacity to organize labour power into marketable 
goods and services. Neoliberalism’s emphasis on ‘competitiveness’ tied workers even closer to the 
success of their specific employer and distanced them from other workers. There was also a notable 
class asymmetry in the impact of competitiveness: when businesses fail, the resultant concentration 
of capital in the strongest firms strengthens capital as a class; however when workers compete, their 
most basic weapon – their solidarity – is undermined and workers are weakened as a class.  
Another barrier to the development of the class is short-termism. The precariousness of 
workers’ lives inclines workers to focus on what is immediate, downplaying the longer-term 
perspective needed to build a challenge to capitalism. This was amplified as neoliberal restructuring 
deepened job insecurity and eroded social safety nets. The collateral damage of that restructuring 
also brought the destruction of working class communities that had, over generations, developed a 
level of class identity that would take a good many years to rebuild.  
Neoliberalism’s restraints on wages had the further impact of influencing the form in which 
workers now got access to consumption, a development that proved especially significant to 
disorganizing workers as a class. Consumption, especially for unionized workers, came to depend 
relatively less on winning wages on the picket line and social benefits on the street and more on 
individualized responses: families, and especially women, worked longer hours; workers went into 
debt; sons or daughters moved in to their parents homes with their partners to save for a mortgage; 
homes were reduced to assets to borrow on and stock market gains were cheered as protecting 
pensions; tax cuts were treated as a wage increase not a social loss. Responding in this individualized 
way, solidaristic impulses faded and collective capacities for struggle atrophied.  
This ability of the state to build on labour’s existing weaknesses and negatively influence the 
creation of a self-conscious working class has left workers in a debilitating limbo. Absent a class 
vision, and especially the structures through which workers could confidently engage in collective 
struggle, an energy-draining fatalism spread: a sense that what happens can’t be influenced, that 
workers weren’t actors in their own lives. Capitalism once presented itself as the best option; now it 
went a step further and claimed to be the only option. With personal survival deemed the only 
realistic goal, workers themselves became implicated in reproducing the competitive, individualized 
spirit of neoliberalism.  
The left often laments workers’ lack of radicalism or blames union leaders for this state of 
affairs. But though trade union leaders, having been elected to lead, obviously bear a 
disproportionate responsibility for what does and doesn’t occur, the problem goes much deeper. It 
lies in the very nature of unions. Unions are sectional, not class organizations, representing specific 
groups of workers with particular skills or sharing a common workplace or subsector. That focus on 
the self-interests of a subgroup – as opposed to a larger, solidaristic class vision – is fertile ground for 
workers seeing unions as an insurance policy: dues are exchanged for bargaining and representational 
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services. That in turn invites a tendency to leave most of what happens in unions to leaders and 
technical experts, setting the foundation for the bureaucratization of union structures. 
In the immediate post WWII years, this organizational form nevertheless delivered the goods. 
It made gains that also spread to other parts of the working class. But as recent history emphatically 
asserts, that moment is effectively over. Sectional unions have proved to be no match for what 
workers are up against under neoliberal capitalism. Even when Canadian unions made the fight and 
reached beyond their particular interests, such as during the very politicized days of action, they 
eventually returned to their separate collective bargaining rounds. There was no ability to put the 
days of action in the context of a broader struggle, no organized concern to develop the young 
workers who were introduced to an exciting activism through these actions, and no strategy for 
continuing to build capacities and alliances in the communities that had been mobilized but then 
abandoned as the protests moved on to other cities.  
This shouldn’t be surprising. On their own, labour leaders are either overwhelmed with just 
keeping their organizations going or in some cases – because it makes their own job easier – even 
quietly content to see their members blame globalization and neoliberalism for everything and lower 
their expectations of the union and its leadership. As for the rank-and-file, they are in the main too 
cut off from each other and from other struggles and don’t have the historical memory, confidence 
and resources to successfully sustain pressures for a radical re-orientation.  
Inspiring examples of unions ‘doing it right’ certainly do, as noted before, periodically come 
up. But for such examples to become the rule rather than the exception, and for labour to 
accomplish broader goals, requires a different kind of organization with a much deeper politics: one 
with feet both inside and outside unions, grounded in the working class but also specifically geared 
to look beyond the daily grind of bargaining and workplace representation so it can address the 
wider context faced by workers and unions. This was traditionally identified as the role of a socialist 
party – an organization that didn’t reduce politics to making the compromises necessary to win the 
next election and then convincing workers of the limits of the possible. Rather it was an 
organization that was singularly committed to the long-term project of building the working class, in 
all its complexities and dimensions, into a social and political force.  
In this regard, it bears emphasizing the extent to which workers’ ‘own’ social democratic 
parties have not only ceased to play this role (which was in any case always limited) and have 
actually contributed to disorganizing the class. Social democracy has come to believe that capitalism 
is the only way to run a developed economy and underlying its policies and ideology is how to best 
manage capitalism. In the context of intense competition and corporate mobility, this has involved 
social democratic parties educating workers to accept the logic of competitiveness and ultimately to 
accept neoliberalism itself as ‘the only option’, at best claiming that they intend to implement a 
‘kinder’ neoliberalism. Absent a vision of society beyond capitalism, respect for workers as the social 
agency with the potential to realize that vision, and the party as the critical vehicle for developing 
that potential, social democracy has instead served to confuse, demoralize, disorient, divide and 
disarm workers.  
Since no such mass socialist party yet exists in Canada, the intimidating question for those 
concerned with getting from here to there is how to better defend the working class and start a 
process of union renewal today, while also laying the groundwork for the eventual development of 
that indispensable party. For the moment, the critical strategic element seems to lie in trying to 
bring class sensibilities into unions, and I want to spend the rest of my talk raising what this might 
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1. Class and internal democracy 
The first point should be obvious but often isn’t. A movement committed to a more profound 
democracy and equality in society has to be all the more democratic and egalitarian internally. As 
Lois Weiner has put it, ‘if unions are not democratic, even if they fight for social justice, they 
perpetuate hierarchical relations that disempower workers.’8 
This is not just a matter of principle and example, but also of being effective. The democratic 
skills we aspire to developing can only emerge through democratic participation; a movement run 
exclusively from the top, as opposed to leaders being catalysts for the widest and deepest 
participation, is inherently limited in sustaining mobilization. And a class divided along gender and 
race can’t be expected to act as a coherent whole; solidarity depends on an active organizational 
commitment to establishing the fundamental equality of its members both inside and outside our 
unions. 
  
2. Dues vs. building the class 
The blame for the limited success of unions in organizing new members, whether in the more 
stable or precarious sectors, falls primarily of course at the feet of employers and the state. But it is 
in no small part also a reflection of unions seeing organizing in terms of increasing the dues-paying 
membership rather than as building the working class. Among other things, this leads to counter-
productive competition among unions for dues-paying members as opposed to – what today seems 
unthinkable – unions actually cooperating across union boundaries. And it is only an orientation to 
building the class that is likely to make organizing into the kind of crusade that can elicit the 
commitment, energy, and resources needed for making the breakthroughs into new sectors.  
Some unions have come to understand that the community and not just the workplace frames 
worker attitudes. But what remains rare, as Jane McAlevey has emphasized, is an appreciation of the 
capacities of workers to be trained to themselves become key organizers in the sub-communities they 
inhabit – churches, schools, ethnic groups, community centers, sports clubs, etc.9 Appreciation of 
the significance of the community may also lead to new working class structures to both organize 
and represent workers. It may, for example, be that city-wide unions rather than sectoral unions are 
the best way to gather and represent fast-food workers or even all precarious workers in a city. Or 
that city-wide worker assemblies are the best way to bring unionized and non-union workers 
together as a solidaristic and political urban force.10 
In all the attention given to organizing precarious workers, it’s rather remarkable that so little 
attention has been paid to recently laid off union members, many of whom are now the very same 
precarious workers unions talk of organizing. Staying in touch with those former members through 
information sessions, educationals, and cultural events at union halls retains contacts that can be 
converted to organizing opportunities as these workers move on to their new jobs and also makes it 
possible to mobilize them around union campaigns for jobs and social benefits. Ignoring these 
former members is not just a missed opportunity but a political danger, as frustrated workers come 
to resent the union as only considering them important when they were contributing dues.  
 
3.  Unions and public sector leadership  
While public sector unions have focused on bargaining and workplace grievances, the state has 
imposed severe political limits on outcomes that go beyond the more publicized budgetary 
constraints. They have negated seniority rights of teachers, privatized health care services, and 
rushed to remove the right to strike where it was effective. Responding to this clearly demands 
coordination beyond particular workplaces, sectors and unions. What, for example, should the 
overall goals be? Should there be an all-out strike or rotating strikes? Which sectors should go first 
so the unions, not the state, set the tone? And ultimately this aggressive attack on workers and social 
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services demands the participation of not just the public sector unions but the entire working class 
and labour’s allies.  
Governments have been able to isolate public sector workers by framing the choices as 
spending money on worker compensation or on public services. This has been reinforced by 
contrasting the condition of public sector workers to the concessions swallowed by private sector 
workers, the inability of young workers to find work, and welfare recipients who have seen their 
social assistance eroded. In combatting this, public sector workers are certainly right to defend their 
pay and argue for higher taxes on the rich to pay for decent services and fair compensation. They can 
emphasize that workers’ frustrations concern with ever-higher workloads and deteriorating working 
conditions are directly related to the deterioration of the level and quality of services. And they can 
point to conference resolutions that confirm the strong support of their unions for social services. 
But none of this will convince a sceptical public, including other workers.  
The only way to make inroads with the public is to concretely demonstrate – through what 
public sector unions do in bargaining, in their relationships to service recipients, and on the streets –
that it is the public sector workers and not the state, who are the defenders of and leaders in the 
fight for adequate, high-quality and responsive social services. This would entail the most significant 
changes to all of labour’s strategies, tactics and structures. It implies reallocating union resources, 
building new local and sectoral as well as national capacities, a profound deepening of membership 
participation, rethinking how unions relate to the community, daring to publically expose poor 
services while speaking to how they could be improved, and taking the unprecedented step of 
placing the level and quality of services on the bargaining table as priorities. More generally it involves 
developing the confidence and vision to move beyond fighting on the enemies’ terrain – a terrain on 
which competitiveness and keeping bankers happy has dominated all else. 
It also means creatively addressing how to use workers’ workplace leverage to supplement 
strikes. In the 2009 garbage strike in Toronto, for example, garbage piled up in public parks and 
angered the public. Wouldn’t it have been better to take the garbage to Bay street parking lots to 
symbolically make the connection between the banks and austerity? Was it possible to limit the 
strike at its start to rich neighbourhoods to highlight the class essence of the struggle, in particular, 
the refusal of the rich to support social services by accepting increased taxes on their rapidly rising 
wealth? Might bus drivers, instead of starting with a strike, continue to work but refuse to collect 
fares? And when ordered to collect fares could they do so passively, refusing to enforce fare 
collection as a health and safety issue? Should unions play a whistle-blowing role in exposing flaws in 
the public service rather than defensively denying them? Should unions be setting up public sector 
councils in every section of the public service consisting of both workers and their clients to defend 
social services? 
 
4.  Unions and jobs 
There is a contradiction at the core of unions that especially surfaces in times of employment 
insecurity. The top priority of members is to hang on to their jobs, but unions are not inherently 
institutions for getting or keeping work; they are about the price of conditions of worker’s labour 
power once they are working. This problem is compounded by the fact that the job insecurity also 
undermines the union ability to deliver on the bargaining unions are allegedly structured to do. It is 
difficult, in short, to imagine union renewal without addressing access to decent jobs.  
The argument that strengthening corporations and weakening unions will lead to decent jobs 
has been exposed; though sitting on hordes of cash, pro-corporate policies haven’t led to the 
investment adequate to establish anything close to full employment, and certainly not well-paying 
secure jobs. The problem isn’t the weakness of corporations but their unchecked power.  
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Prioritizing job security can’t help but raise radical issues. Modest interventions that don’t 
challenge private control over the economy bring only modest results. Seriously addressing jobs 
means recognizing that the radical has now become the practical. It demands confronting 
corporations over closures, free trade, deregulation of markets, anti-worker flexibility, tax policy, 
capital controls, and especially control over the banking system and the allocation of society’s profits 
and savings. This is all the more so if the issue isn’t jobs in the abstract, but their impact on equality 
and the environment. 
Consider this in the context of the recent auto bail-outs. Instead of pushing for policies that 
lead to more cars on the road, independent of whether this makes social and environmental sense, 
the union could have pointed to the much greater conversions that occurred during WWII and 
reconversion after.11 The union could then have argued for the planned changeover of valuable tools, 
equipment and worker skills rejected by profits and the market to alternative social uses such as the 
environmental demands that will dominate the rest of this century: transportation and energy grids, 
the design and retrofitting of housing, modifications to the equipment and processes employed in 
factories and offices. 
Addressing jobs would then be framed not as saving GM but as saving communities and the 
impressive productive capacity that resides in the industry and workforce; not in terms of restoring 
profits but in terms of addressing social needs; not as accepting competitiveness as the arbiter of our 
material lives but as raising democratic planning within an expanded public sector. Regionally, it 
might involve community plans that guarantee what common sense suggests any society should 
provide: productive work or training for anyone who wants it. It’s assumed that everyone has the 
right to an education and it is not a stretch to aggressively insist that everyone who wants to 
contribute productively should have the right to do so. This might be done through establishing 
elected local institutions – job development boards – to take responsibility for canvassing the 
community for unmet needs and unused skills, providing technical expertise to convert plants in 
danger of closing, and running economic literacy classes to expand the capacity for broad 
participation.12 
  
5.  Labour and the movements 
Most of the anti-establishment energy since the late 90s has come not from labour but from 
social movements such as Occupy, the G-20 protests, idle no more, and environmental campaigns 
such as that targeting the tar sands and the Enbridge pipeline. These movements have looked to the 
labour movement for resources and support and labour in turn has gotten a degree of popular 
legitimacy from their movement links. This is an unambiguously positive development and it should 
clearly be encouraged and deepened. Yet its potential for reviving the labour and building an 
alternative politics that brings labour and the social movements together needs some sober 
assessment.  
Three particular problems are worth highlighting. First, though labour and the movements 
may have a loose consensus around the opposition to neoliberalism, an effective coalition would 
need to be more specific about joint priorities. Especially difficult would be overcoming cultural and 
political differences to come up with joint tactics and strategies. For example, many movement 
activists see their particular issue as the end point of their politics, not as a step towards a larger 
politics, and quickly run out of steam.  
Second, the social movements in Canada are not mass movements. Their base of activists is 
generally small, the issues they focus on specific not general, and they have shown little capacity to 
move beyond protest to build and sustain a larger politics. Given labour’s own weakness, the 
problem is that adding two floundering movements together doesn’t in fact give us all that much. 
This was made especially clear at Occupy’s peak. Occupy created an opening by showing that 
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audacious action can meet with sympathy and their 1% slogan demonstrated the same is true for 
introducing a class language, even if oversimplified. Unions responded with logistical support – when 
what was really called for was leveraging their workplace presence to occupy spaces that weren’t just 
symbolic: government buildings, schools, and factories. But that kind of joint action didn’t emerge 
and Occupy soon faded.  
A third issue is that labour approaches social movements as ‘others’ with whom to ally 
politically, rather than recognizing them as often representing those parts of the working class 
unions so often ignore. Worker action centers, immigrant rights groups, personal care support 
networks, and anti-poverty organizations all represent parts of the working class which have fallen 
on, or are stuck in, hard times. And a good many social movements are not ‘others’ in another way: 
they focus on those dimensions of working class life that extend beyond the workplace (such as 
environmentalists addressing the air working class families breathe and the water they drink, 
community groups fighting hospital or school closings, housing and tenants groups demanding 
affordable housing).  
 
6.  Social movement or class-sensitive unionism?  
Among those sympathetic to labour movement renewal, the term ‘social movement unionism’ 
has been used to characterize, against ‘business unionism’, a unionism with broader perspectives. 
However useful a role this distinction once played in initiating a discussion on union direction, it 
now obscures more than it clarifies. Essentially all unions now self-identify as ‘social movement 
unions’ and this speaks to the vagueness of the term. The issue here is not only the range of 
commitments this might involve – from charity work to financially supporting allies in their own 
organizing – but something more profound. While turning to social movement unionism focuses on 
adding activities to what unions were doing, what it avoided was the more controversial discussion 
of the internal changes unions needed to undergo if union were to contribute to a ‘class sensibility’. 
The point is not to imagine unions being transformed into class institutions in the sense of 
representing the class as a whole – their very nature in terms of representing particular workers and 
sectors limits this. Rather, it is that a class sensibility emphasizes: a) workers as agents (what Marta 
Harnecker calls ‘protagonists’13) with the potential to be organizers in both the workplace and the 
community; b) that bringing class into the analysis of what workers face and who stands with them 
can strengthen their particular struggles; c) raising class is part of raising a vision that imagines, and 
pushes workers to think about, their role in bringing about an alternative different society; and d) 
the possibility of unions, in combination with socialists, opening the door to serving, even to a 
limited extent, as ‘schools of socialism’ that might recruit workers to the socialist cause.  
To move to this kind of unionism, however, demands a virtual revolution inside unions – not 
just adding external functions - because it implies changing so much about unions in terms of 
relationships to members, the focus of research, the allocation of funds, the role of staff and the kind 
of training that staff and activists get, the weight of more general internal education, new internal 
structures for relating to the community and other unions, the very nature and place of collective 
bargaining as the lifeblood of unions, the approach to grievances, the relationship to political parties, 
etc., etc.  
 
7.  The environment and democratic planning 
Working people are increasingly aware of the environmental crisis and its threat to themselves 
and their families. And many unions now have progressive environmental positions. But to seriously 
deal with this crisis can’t help but raise a range of uncomfortable issues that will need to be taken 
on: the profound restructuring of jobs and industries, changes in how we consume and what we 
consider valuable, rethinking our cities.  
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Trying to overcome this by expecting that people will be galvanized into action by the 
warning that the end is imminent is, however, counter-productive (which is certainly not to say that 
scientific truths should be hidden from people). Because we are not anywhere near building the 
social base required to comprehensively deal with the environment, such predictions only lead 
people to despair and to give up rather than to mobilize. The world will likely still be here decades 
from now. The issue is how much uglier and inhospitable it will be and the extent to which income 
inequalities will be extended to even greater inequities over access to air, water, and nature.  
It therefore seems more useful to frame the environmental crisis as part of the broader struggle 
against neoliberalism. If dealing with the environment will make restraints on consumption 
necessary, the costs should be equitably shared as part of a radical redistribution of income and 
wealth. This also points to the importance of a cultural shift in the balance between individual 
consumption and collective consumption. And it would mean linking jobs and the environment 
through both desperately needed infrastructural renewal (including mass transit); and, as mentioned 
earlier, the conversion of potentially productive facilities rejected by the market to the production of 
socially useful and environmentally necessary products and services.  
All this would impel us to place democratic planning on the agenda and start talking about 
making private banks into public utilities so we control the financial resources to implement the 
above. Going further, it poses the question of whether capitalism, with its fundamental orientation 
to competition, profits and thoughtless growth, has itself become the main barrier to environmental 
sanity.  
 
8.  Internationalism 
Social justice is universal and so the responsibility of any progressive movement is to oppose 
all forms of oppression – whether they be class-based or not – at home and in all parts of the world. 
A crucial aspect of internationalism has always been to fight against the interference of our state or 
other states in the experiments of other countries to develop a better society. And environmental 
deliberations must include an appreciation of the fact that if the Global South is to catch up to us 
and the environment is to be preserved, the developed countries may need to consciously grow 
slower. Where particular struggles break out from time to time, like an especially significant strike 
abroad, our support should clearly be there. And as globalization pushes desperate workers out of 
their countries in search of a livelihood and our country brings them in so as to access their labour, 
we should join their fight for basic rights and fair treatment as part of the broader working class.  
Yet the reality we keep coming back to is that if the labour movement can’t establish 
solidarity between private and public sectors at home, between steel workers and auto workers, 
between workers in Alberta and Ontario, it is naive to imagine workers building any deep solidarity 
with workers much more separated by distance, history, language, and social context. If we can’t 
develop our power domestically as a class, we can’t be of much help in struggles abroad.  
Our greatest contribution to internationalism is therefore to make the fight and build the 
working class at home. Concessions undermine workers elsewhere; gains expand the space for others 
to make gains. As for more dramatic international support, like massive transfers of technologies and 
skills to support development in the Global South, this can’t be done until we actually control that 
technology and live in quite a different world than one based on private corporations competing for 
profits. In the case of Europe today, a crucial question if the Syriza party in fact comes to power in 
Greece and challenges the imposition of continental austerity is whether working classes across 
Europe (and especially in Germany) can demonstrate the solidaristic capacity to limit the aggressive 
determination of their own states to crush the Greeks and instead push their states towards 
accommodating to the expressed frustrations and needs of the Greek people.  
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The issue of internationalism raises a further difficult question, especially for Canadians. Given 
the degree of integration of Canada’s economy, military and state with the US, how far can 
Canadian workers actually go if change is not also occurring in the US? Two points seem crucial in 
trying to deal with this dilemma. First, we can’t fully win if there aren’t parallel struggles occurring 
elsewhere, above all in the US, but neither can we wait for that to happen. So we need to start 
where we are, even if any gains will remain incomplete. Second, our relationship to the American 
empire means that our strategies must include moving to reduce our dependency. But that too is a 
class question, not a national one; the opposition to such a direction would first and vehemently 
come from Canadian business.  
 
9.  Middle class?  
My last point addresses one of the greatest ironies of the present moment. At a time when the 
reality of class divisions is more evident than ever, workers seem to increasingly reject the self-
identification as ‘working class’ in preference to describing themselves as part of a vague ‘middle 
class’.  
This involves more than a pragmatic attempt to find a more legitimate language for defending 
workers. To begin with, such language excludes a good part of the working class that is decidedly 
not ‘middle-class’: the poor, the unemployed, those in precarious work or non-union low-paid jobs. 
In the US in particular, ‘middle-class’ has become code for excluding poor blacks and immigrant 
Latinos. While dividing the working class in this way, the notion of workers as ‘middle class’ tends 
to integrate the unionized and relatively better paid workers into an amorphous grouping that 
extends to professionals, entrepreneurs, and lower management, some of whose incomes are up to a 
quarter of a million dollars annually. This comes with a political agenda focused on lower taxes and 
government cutbacks. What gets marginalized are issues potentially shared across workers. Issues 
like dignity on the job and the pressures of increased workloads; the restructuring of the economy 
and despair over decent jobs for our kids; the threat to social programs of particular importance to 
working people like health care, the quality of education, unemployment insurance; the inadequacy 
of minimum wages, welfare rates and pensions; the legalized corruption in the private sector as well 
as within the state. 
Capitalist elites have understandably been happy to see workers disarm themselves by 
repudiating any talk of ‘class’, ‘class conflict’ and ‘class struggle’. For the labour movement, however, 
this retreat from class is also a retreat from workers’ historic potentials and responsibilities as agents 
of transformative social change. To explicitly speak on behalf of the working class is, as labour 
historian Nelson Lichtenstein puts it, ‘to begin to educate millions of Americans to the realization 




The great breakthrough of trade unionism came from the understanding that workers had 
precious little power facing employers on their own and needed to establish their own permanent 
institutions independent of employers and governments. As times change so do workers’ strategic 
needs. The lesson of the past three decades is that the answer to the problem of our weakness as 
individuals – unions – are, on their own, also not enough and the notion of the ‘collective’ must be 
raised to the class as a whole. 
Not only does the working class need multiple collectivities beyond unions to deal with all the 
class issues raised earlier, but it also needs a broader, over-riding organization with a larger vision. 
That organization – a socialist party of a new kind – would have to transform these various 
fragments, above all the unions, as part of bringing them together. Most generally, the point of the 
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party is to develop our individual and collective understandings and capacities to confront capitalism 
and dream again of creating a new society.  
At a moment when we cannot simply declare the formation of such a party of the left, what 
needs exploration is what can be done in the interim to make it possible down the road. What kind 
of initiatives, intermediate organizational structures, networks of activists across every workplace 
and in every community, and education and strategies can create a social force that can begin the 
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